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Abstract

The civil application of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) has been misapplied by the lower courts, but the statute can be improved by
incorporating elements that will make the statute a better tool for justice. It is evident
from examining the procedural limitations of the statute and important case law that the
securities fraud gap, terrorism financing, and difficulties for indirect victims are three
critical subjects that need to be addressed by enhancing RICO. Flaws and shortcomings
of the RICO statute have led to inconsistencies in court rulings. The expansive language
of RICO can be limited to reduce the culpability of foreign sovereigns and violators of
personal use copyright infringement. Upon a survey of seven possible solutions, this
thesis determines that the best solution would be for Congress to amend the law. The
creators of RICO could refine and clarify the language and implement the features
necessary to broaden RICO so it can fulfill its maximum potential. Data was collected by
reviewing research, case statistics, academic journals, and court cases.
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Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and when they fail in this
purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social
progress.
—Martin Luther King, Jr.
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Redefining the RICO Statute
Potential Avenues for Improvement
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) is a statute
designed to prosecute and convict criminal organizations. Because of the complex
structure of a criminal enterprise, it is difficult to convict the leaders without RICO
(Pierson, 2012). RICO is valuable because it is a broad and expansive statute.
Three main issues with RICO to examine are the ambiguous language of the
statute, court ruling inconsistencies, and lack of breadth of the statute. The first problem
demonstrates the inherent flaws with RICO that require the statute to be redefined so that
it can be construed in accordance with the will of Congress (Brady, 1986; Nybo, 2013;
Pierson, 2013). The inconsistencies in court rulings demonstrate the need for further
plain and clear language. In addition, a group of scholars believe that the RICO statute
should be broadened so a greater variety of unlawfully acting parties can be brought to
justice (Geisler, 2010; Weiss, 2010; Blakey & Gerardi, 2014). The resolution to all three
of these problems is a solution in which certain elements of the statute are better defined
and others are expanded.
History and Application of RICO
Origination of RICO
The United States Congress enacted RICO as a part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 to help in the fight against organized crime. RICO was “designed to
penetrate organizations and impose liability on those who orchestrate criminal acts but
insulate themselves with layers of underlings and bureaucracy” (Pierson, 2012, p. 524).
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The statute was created in reaction to the control and influence that the Mafia had on the
business world as it operated inside and outside of the realm of legitimate business
operations (Weiss, 2010). RICO was created to combat the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime (Blakey, 2012). RICO has two different functions:
authorizing the government to prosecute and enabling private plaintiffs to bring suits
against alleged violators of the law. The criminal section of RICO grants the government
the authority to apply criminal penalties to the leaders of organized crime, and the civil
section of RICO empowers victims to recover damages from the misconduct of criminal
organizations (Pierson). Ultimately, the goal behind the creation of RICO was to “protect
society and the economy from the ill effects of organized crime” by giving power to the
victims and government” (Nybo, 2013, p. 23).
Use of RICO
The civil section of RICO provides an opportunity for victims to create claims
against entities in violation of the act. Civil actions can be made against commercial
organizations even if they are not related to an enterprise that is solely criminal (Cotham
& Campbell, 1982). The reason behind offering remedies for RICO in civil court was
due to the prevalence of organized crime at the creation of the statute. The Senate
Judiciary Committee emphasized that an attack should be made on all fronts in the fight
against the economic powers of racketeering organizations (Geisler, 2010). Civil court
RICO actions have the potential to be used in cases ranging from securities fraud and
commercial bribery, to theft and violent crime. The RICO civil statute is an extremely
valuable tool for compensating victims because it grants remedies up to triple the amount
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of damages plus attorney fees. RICO is an attractive opportunity for the plaintiff to
obtain justice because it gives the advantages to him or her. The plaintiff gets to choose
the federal forum, use federal rules of evidence and discovery, and use the expansive
venue provisions (Cotham & Campbell). The goal behind offering private civil remedies
for RICO is to protect “the honest businessman who is damaged by unfair competition
from the racketeer businessman” (Anza v. ISS Corp., 2006, p. 473).
Current Stading of RICO
Prosecutors employ RICO to combat crime because it imposes severe sanctions
and necessitates proving only mens rea for the predicate crimes (Bagley, Hurley &
Mancuso, 2007). The RICO civil statute is a valuable tool utilized to fight white collar
crime. In 2010, nine hundred fifty-five civil RICO cases were filed, and between 2001
and 2010, almost five times more civil RICO cases were initiated than criminal RICO
cases (Pierson, 2012). An update to the Pierson study done between the years of 2005
and 2011 showed similar results. Between 2005 and 2011, two hundred twenty-seven
opinions were rendered on RICO cases; 69% were civil and 31% were criminal (Pierson,
2013). In the span of the study, 2006 represented the year with the most cases, and an
average of 22.5 decisions were made per year (Pierson, 2013).
Civil claims with RICO are an attractive option because civil RICO offers an
award of treble damages, a broad choice of venue, and it can even be applied in class
action suits (Cooney, Lavelle, Shariati, 2010). Plaintiffs have a broad choice of venue
because RICO claims can be brought against an entity in any jurisdiction as long as the
entity resides, has an agent located in, or transacts business in that jurisdiction according
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to 18 U.S.C. Section 1965(c) (Cooney). A significant number of civil RICO cases are
class actions, and because of recent case law development making the elements more
understandable, more class action suits are expected in the future (Pierson, 2013).
Nationwide class action suits with other laws usually face a challenge with choice-of-law
concerning fraud and deception laws, but class action civil RICO claims need to prove
only the predicate acts, so class action suits are potentially more effective with RICO
(Cooney).
Most civil RICO cases have been brought by or against businesses, which may
indicate that it is being wielded in accordance with Congress’s intent: to combat
sophisticated business frauds (Pierson, 2013). However, about 18% of civil RICO cases
are claims that are not based on the intended use of RICO; 9% of cases are brought
against law enforcement by individuals convicted for crimes, and the other 9% of cases
were brought by individuals trying to settle “trivial personal agreements” (Pierson, p.
222).
The frivolous application of civil RICO cases can be demonstrated from the
success rate of the plaintiffs. In civil RICO cases, plaintiffs win only 17% of the time
(Pierson, 2013). Despite the low success rate for plaintiffs, when they do win, the
defense earns a big payout. For example, some cases had settlements of $218 million,
$177 million, and $121.8 million with the costs of attorney’s fees, which have amounted
to almost $30 million in one case (Pierson).
Because civil cases only require preponderance of the evidence as opposed to the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases, it is less arduous to investigate and
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prove guilt; this is essential in white collar cases because it is harder to assess intent and
determine who knew the crime was being committed (Pierson, 2012). Civil cases are
also much less expensive than criminal cases because defendants have less procedural
protections and cases are resolved quicker (Pierson). Remedies in civil cases can be
applied in a variety of ways that are more applicable to companies and organizations,
which ensures that the jobs of innocent people are protected and the continuation of
essential services to the public (Pierson). With the encouragement of high profits, civil
RICO inspires knowledgeable victims and the finest private attorneys to form cases with
the best resources to punish the instigators of white-collar crime (Pierson). Despite the
increased use of civil RICO, it has had varied applications due to its ambiguous language,
which may indicate a problem (Pierson).
Problem Identification
RICO is a complex statute that is not well defined; it lacks clarity and has been
applied in different courts regarding the plaintiff’s standing in the case (Lloyd, 2007;
Cutler, 1990). Even the creators of the law recognized that the language in RICO is very
broad; the Organized Crime Control Act offers the provision that RICO “shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes (OCCA, 1970; Cotham &
Campbell, 1982, 226). Early after its creation, law practitioners recognized that future
court cases would determine its effectiveness. Cotham and Campbell say that with any
amendments to the law, “decisions yet to be rendered will explain more fully what the
tool is good for and who can use it” (p. 263). Due to the broad language, some authors
argue that the language of the powerful statute needs to be better defined (Brady, 1986;
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Nybo, 2013; Pierson, 2013); others believe that the effectiveness of RICO needs to be
expanded to serve justice in more situations (Geisler, 2010; Weiss, 2010; Blakey &
Gerardi, 2014). Another problem with the statute is how it has been applied
inconsistently in different circuits of the federal court system.
The law’s construction has been altered due to the expansive language of RICO.
The Supreme Court has had to repeatedly enforce the broad interpretation of standing of
the victims. In order to sue under civil RICO, the victim must prove a violation of
Section 1962, injury to his or her business or property, and causation of the injury by the
violation (Bagley, Hurley & Mancuso, 2007). The plaintiff must further demonstrate that
the predicate act is “independently wrongful under RICO” (Bagley, p. 945). In a 1994
case, the Supreme Court eliminated the Seventh District’s restriction that the racketeering
enterprise be accompanied by an economic motive (Bagley, p. 942).
Coppola and DeMarco (2012) believe that RICO’s ambiguity and the judiciary’s
tendency to interpret it liberally has allowed RICO to expand beyond its intended
purpose. Attempts to brandish RICO creatively include suing the Catholic Church
leaders for covering up instances of sexual abuse, suing British Petroleum for concealing
flaws in deep-water drilling plans, and suing Pfizer for marketing an epilepsy drug for
prescriptions not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (Coppola & DeMarco).
The victims of the Pfizer case were awarded $47.4 million, which was then tripled under
the RICO treble damages provision further explaining the ambition of creative lawyers
and witnesses in need to take advantage of the civil RICO provision (Coppola &
DeMarco). It is clear that civil RICO has been exploited in ways that congress could not
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have imagined; however, the issue is determining whether the law should be better
defined or left open for a variety of uses. Each of the three main issues related to the
RICO law can be analyzed by considering specific examples that prove the statute is
partially deficient.
The Statute Needs To be Better Defined
A consistent attitude among legal commentators is that the far-reaching language
in the statute needs to be better defined when considering the volume of civil cases, the
broad language, copyright infringement, and foreign sovereigns (Nybo, 2013; Geisler,
2010; Pierson, 2013; Ross, 2010; Corrigan, 2010).
Large Volume of Civil RICO Cases
Some argue that the RICO civil statute has been and is continually abused
because courts are not using enough discretion when determining which parties can bring
suit (Nybo, 2013). According to a study done in 2002, one hundred eighty-five RICO
cases between 1999 and 2001 were decided by the federal appellate courts, and of those
cases, 78% were civil and 22% were criminal (Bucy, 2002). This study shows that
private litigants may have more motivation to pursue justice than federal prosecutors.
This may be due to limited resources of the Department of Justice (Nybo). Further
analysis on this study shows that only three of the one hundred forty-five civil RICO
cases resulted in a final victory for the plaintiffs (Bucy). Based on the success rate of the
civil RICO cases and the disparity in the number between civil and criminal cases, the
issue is not related to resource allocation but to a high number of private plaintiffs filing
frivolous claims (Nybo).
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American Bar Association Task Force Study
The expansive utilization of civil RICO is not a recent discovery. In 1985 in the
case of Sedima v. Imrex, Justice Byron White cited a study done by the American Bar
Association Task Force which found that only 9% of two hundred seventy civil RICO
cases were about allegations related to criminal activity generally associated with
professional criminals. Of the remaining cases, 40% involved securities fraud and 37%
were related to commercial or business common-law fraud (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985).
These statistics indicate that RICO has become less of an instrument wielded for fighting
organized crime and more of an instrument to bring simple fraud cases against legitimate
business enterprises (Nybo, 2013). The motivation behind civil RICO litigation is
certainly related to the opportunity to earn treble damages, which leads to many frivolous
civil RICO cases (Nybo). The wide and varied use of RICO demonstrated in this study is
directly related to the broad language in the statute.
Broad Language
Within RICO, many expressions have very broad definitions (Geisler, 2010). For
instance, a person is defined as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property” (18 U.S.C. §1962(a); Geisler, 2010, p. 614). An
enterprise can be any individual, partnership, corporation, or legal entity (18 U.S.C.
§1961(4)). A “pattern of racketeering” requires only two acts of racketeering activity (18
U.S.C. §1961(5)). The term “racketeering activity” must be one of the eighty federal
criminal acts listed in Title 18, and each of the eighty crimes will have its own definition
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also (18 U.S.C. §1961(1); Geisler). Three important elements that could be better
defined are pattern, proximate cause, and enterprise.
Definitions of Pattern, Proximate Causation, and Enterprise
The main issues discussed in RICO cases are pattern, proximate causation, and
enterprise, which account for 69% of all RICO issues discussed (Pierson, 2013). The
difficulty in applying these issues in civil RICO cases is part of the reason that RICO has
been “overused, underused, and maligned” (Pierson, p. 225).
In order to prove a RICO violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate a pattern or a
continual series of violating predicate acts. Courts have had different interpretations of
what constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity. The pattern requirement for RICO is
considered vague and non-intuitive when compared to most other criminal statutes
(Pierson, 2013). However, the Supreme Court has given enough guidance, according to
Pierson, to make this element of RICO predictable.
The second issue is with determining “whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury has
been proximately cause by the defendant’s alleged conduct” (Pierson, 2013, p. 223).
Based on three important Supreme Court cases, a clear standard for what it takes to prove
proximate causation now exists (Pierson, p. 246). One of the most difficult elements to
prove by the plaintiffs is that their injury is directly related to the defendant’s alleged
violation of RICO (Pierson, p. 241). Also, the plaintiff must prove that other factors
besides the alleged RICO misconduct did not contribute to the injury (Pierson, p. 246).
Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is the primary victim and most
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deserving of the damages (Pierson, p. 246). It may also be beneficial for the plaintiff to
prove that no other statute is in place to address the injury at issue (Pierson, p. 246).
The third issue is determining what constitutes an enterprise in the RICO
provisions. The lower federal courts often interpret the enterprise element very narrowly,
while the Supreme Court has often applied a very broad definition of enterprise (Pierson,
2013). Even if a group is informally formed and loosely organized, it is still considered
an enterprise under the law (Pierson). In addition to the broad language of the statute,
another issue is related to copyright infringement.

Copyright Infringement
The purpose of copyright law is to encourage the creation of artistic works as well
as encourage access to those creative works to the public (Ross, 2010). According to
Ross, copyright infringement should be removed from the list of predicate acts as a part
of RICO, or Congress should limit the RICO liability for copyright infringement to the
most significant commercial offenders. Many people in the younger generation (tweens
to those in their mid-twenties) believe that copyright laws are “unfair or inapplicable” for
private use (Ross, 2012, p. 57). Recognizing copyright infringement as a predicate crime
gives civil courts too much power by granting them access to treble damages (Ross,
2010, p. 71). By granting copyright holders this much power, too much authority is
given to the monopolistic entities and not enough to the public interest (Ross, p. 63).
Presently, the penalties for copyright infringement are very severe. The RICO statute has
already been broadly interpreted to include conduct beyond that of its intended purpose
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by ignoring its legislative history (Ross, p. 62). If the penalty for infringements are too
severe, copyright owners will have increased monopolistic rights over creative items and
the public will have less access to those works (Ross).
The purpose of RICO was to offer remedies to those injured by criminal
enterprises; however, the courts have expanded and broadly interpreted the RICO statute
beyond what Congress intended (Ross, 2010). Ross proposes that Congress should
amend the law to remove copyright infringement as a predicate act for RICO, or simply
limit the exploitation of RICO in the cases of copyright infringement to those “defendants
that engage in large-scale, commercial piracy and not those who copy for private use” (p.
63).
The criminal side of RICO enables prosecutors to apply discretion when
determining whom to prosecute, while the government is limited to prosecuting “the most
severe, profit seeking conduct” (Ross, 2010, p. 125). In contrast, copyright owners have
no obligation to show the same discretion under the civil section (Ross, p. 125).
Ross (2010) suggests that increasing the pattern requirement, narrowing the
enterprise requirement, limiting penalties, or simply removing copyright infringement
completely from the list of predicate acts in section 1961(1) will increase RICO’s
effectiveness. The pattern requirement should be increased to the point that only a full
scale criminal enterprise can be sued. The enterprise element should be narrowly
interpreted, especially to exclude those who simply participate in peer-to-peer sharing
(Ross). Removing copyright infringement from RICO is a viable option because the
Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act already protects against counterfeiting
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goods and services and organized trafficking (Ross, p. 126). However, if the federal
legislators believe counterfeiting should remain a part of RICO, it should be limited to
include only cases of commercial and for profit counterfeiting, not for personal use
counterfeiting (Ross, p. 63). Similar to how Ross believes that small scale counterfeiting
should not be a predicate act to RICO, Corrigan argues that foreign sovereigns should be
immune to civil RICO claims (Ross, p. 56; Corrigan, 2010).
Foreign Sovereigns
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FISA) regulates suits against
foreign sovereigns by permitting U.S. courts jurisdictional authority over foreign
sovereigns for only civil claims (Corrigan, 2010). This raises an issue with civil suits in
relation to RICO. Because civil RICO claims require the plaintiff to prove a criminal
element as a part of the predicate acts to determine the presence of racketeering, a
discrepancy exists as to whether a foreign sovereign should be immune to any civil RICO
suit. According to Corrigan, foreign sovereigns should be immune to “civil RICO claims
because they are not subject to jurisdiction for the requisite underlying criminal act
needed to succeed on a RICO claim” (Corrigan, p. 1478). Those with a dissenting
opinion believe that as long as a foreign sovereign is proven to be acting in a commercial
capacity, which is an exception to FISA, then the sovereign may not claim immunity
(Corrigan, p. 1484). A sovereign is deemed to have acted in a commercial capacity when
it is acting in a private, business focused capacity as opposed to a political or regulatory
capacity (Corrigan, p. 1485). Outside of a commercial capacity, the FISA statute grants
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civil jurisdiction to U.S. courts so that U.S. citizens can resolve ordinary legal disputes
with foreign sovereigns (Corrigan, p. 1484).
This difficulty in determining whether U.S. courts have jurisdictional authority to
determine civil RICO cases shows an inherent flaw with the FISA statute and the
complexity of the RICO statute. This discrepancy should be addressed so that courts can
rule consistently, international relations are not negatively affected, and the will of
Congress is followed.
In his article, Corrigan (2010) highlights two cases where two circuits ruled
differently on the submission of a FISA suit with a civil RICO claim. The Tenth Circuit
in the decision of Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 2003, held that a foreign state
was not immune from a civil RICO claim because it had determined that the commercial
activity exception applied, so immunity was denied to the defendant (Corrigan, p. 1490).
Corrigan notes four flaws in the reasoning of this court, and he points out an opposing
opinion from the Sixth Circuit case of Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2002). In this
case, the court determined that commercial exception did not apply, so immunity was
granted (Corrigan, p.1493-1494). The ruling of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the
Tenth Circuits ruling in three ways. First, due to FISA, a foreign sovereign cannot be
indicted based on the wording of the statute; Congress’s silence on criminal jurisdiction
for sovereigns led the court to assume it did not have the authority to decide criminal
matters (Corrigan, p. 1489). Secondly, the provisions in FISA endorse criminal
prosecution only with an existing international agreement, and in this case, none existed
(Corrigan, p. 1494). Lastly, since civil RICO requires that the defendant be indictable

REDEFINING THE RICO STATUTE

18

and FISA does not permit sovereigns to be indicted in the U.S., the court determined that
the sovereign must be immune (Corrigan, p. 1488). A later decision by the Fifth Circuit
also held that sovereigns are immune to civil RICO because they cannot be indicted
(Corrigan, p. 1495).
Corrigan (2010) suggests that all courts should adopt the analysis of the Sixth
Circuit Court because it reconciles the language of the FISA statute the best and aligns
with its intended purpose. By ruling in this manner, the judicial practice of the U.S.
would better align with international standards (Corrigan, 1499). The flaws with the
interpretation of FISA may be fixed with a more clear definition and language in the civil
RICO statute. Corrigan also notes that this consistent granting of immunity to sovereigns
for civil RICO cases would serve the best interest of private parties, sovereigns, and U.S.
international relations (Corrigan, p. 1503). The inconsistent rulings of the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits are not rare occurrences; three different circuits also had inconsistent
rulings on the element of standing.
Inconsistancies in Civil RICO Cases
Different decisions by the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts
demonstrate that the RICO civil statute needs to be redefined and its intent better
explained by Congress (Lloyd, 2007). This problem needs to be fixed to ensure
consistent judicial interpretation of the law. The broad construction sometimes enables
unpredictable and unanticipated claims to gain access to the federal courts (Coppola &
DeMarco, 2012).
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According to RICO Section 1964(c), a person or his business must be injured in
conjunction with a predicate act of RICO in order to be able to sue for damages (Lloyd,
2007). Even though the Supreme Court has set clear precedents to interpret the statute
broadly, courts have still tried to reduce the scope of the statute (Lloyd). The following
three courts applied standing stipulations in different ways for each case relating to civil
RICO.
The Eleventh Circuit Court: Grogan v. Platt, 1988
In this case four Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents and the estate of
two slain Special Agents were suing a criminal enterprise under civil RICO to obtain
money for physical injuries from a shootout (Grogan v. Platt, 1988). According to the
court manuscripts, the case relied on one main question: “Does RICO's private civil
action provision, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1964(c), permit recovery for the economic aspects of
personal injuries inflicted by predicate acts involving murder?” (Grogan v. Platt, p. 845).
The plaintiffs argued that the personal injuries and deaths constituted an injury in the
statute (Grogan v. Platt). However, the Eleventh Circuit Court disagreed claiming that
the words “business or property” limited the types of injuries that a plaintiff could sue
for, so the court determined the agents did not have standing in the case (Grogan v. Platt,
p. 845; Geisler, 2010). In the following year, the Eleventh Circuit made the same
conclusion in the case of Rylewicz v. Beaton Services Ltd., 1989, that the language
“injury to business or property” does not include physical, mental, or emotional suffering
(Geisler, p. 619).
The Seventh District Court: Doe v. Roe, 1992
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The Doe v. Roe case presented to the Seventh District Court was between a
divorce lawyer and his client. In the words of the court, “we are asked to determine
whether a plaintiff may bring a civil action under RICO where she alleges that her
divorce attorney defrauded her into having sexual relations with him in lieu of payment
for his legal services” (Doe v. Roe, 1992, p. 765). The court determined, in conjunction
with prior district courts’ rulings, that civil RICO action cannot be based solely on
physical or emotional injuries (Doe v. Roe, p. 767). Again it was determined that the
plaintiff did not have standing in the case.
The Ninth Circuit Court: Diaz v. Gates, 2005
The Ninth Circuit Court took on an opposing opinion to those of the Doe case and
Grogan case. In the case of Diaz v. Gates, Diaz (2005) was suing the Los Angeles Police
Department for supposedly being falsely imprisoned. He claims that his alleged false
conviction caused him to lose possible employment opportunities (Diaz v. Gates). The
Ninth Circuit granted Diaz standing because he “properly alleged an injury to business or
property within the meaning of civil RICO” (Lloyd, 2007, p. 138). Their reason for
granting standing was that RICO provides a cause for action when “concrete financial
losses” occur (Lloyd, p. 138).
Conclusion from these three cases. These three cases indicate a problem with
the civil RICO Statute. The statute needs to have a better definition of standing.
According to Lloyd (2005), the judiciary has proven that it is incapable of consistently
applying the standing element in civil RICO in the multitude of districts. Multiple
solutions are available to solve the problems related to how civil RICO should be
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interpreted. The problem can be addressed by the Circuit and District Courts, the
Supreme Court, or the Legislature. In addition to the claim that certain terms need to be
better defined, is the claim that the statute’s language should be extended so that its use is
even more broadened.
The Statute Should Be Broadened
Certain courts have imposed standing restrictions on who can submit RICO
claims, and these restrictions conflict directly with mandates from both the Supreme
Court and Congress (Lloyd, 2007). Without victims being able to sue for damages from
offenders, victims will not have the opportunity to receive justice. Broadening the RICO
statute can remedy some concerns about the recovery of damages for indirect victims,
non-actionable securities fraud cases, suits against organizations that finance terrorism.
The cases of MSMK v. Chase and Sedima v. Imrex also give valuable insight into how the
civil RICO statute can be enhanced.
Indirect Victims
The Supreme Court decision for the case of Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity
Co., 2008, helped to turn RICO into a valuable tool for keeping corporate industries
honest (Geisler, 2010). Following the Bridge case, plaintiffs do not need to prove that
they relied on the defendants misrepresentations to establish elements in civil RICO cases
in instances concerning mail and wire fraud (Brown v. Cassens Transport Co., 2008).
According to Geisler, a direct victim of a predicate act of racketeering should not be the
only party that can claim a remedy in a civil RICO case; an indirect victim, like an honest
competitor who loses market share to a racketeer, should have access to damages when
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no direct victim is available or the direct victim is not capable of making a claim
(Geisler).
Legislative and judicial “tort reform” has made it difficult for individual
consumers to seek damages from corporate wrongdoers (Geisler, 2010, p. 628). This
allows corporate wrongdoers to take advantage of inadequate regulatory oversight to take
market share away from honest competitors (Geisler). In his article, Geisler suggests that
the Court should reshape its proximate cause analysis “to recognize the intended victims
of corporate fraud: honest competitors that have lost market share due to fraud,
deception, and misrepresentation” (p. 612). RICO should be made available for indirect
victims in the same way that organizations that sponsor terrorism should be liable under
RICO.
Terrorism Financiers
Because terrorism is an important and pressing issue today, civil RICO should be
employed as a means to punish those enterprises that fund terrorism (Weiss, 2010). Civil
RICO should not be constrained but instead, its breadth should be guaranteed by
legislative action to allow for civil suits against organizations responsible for terrorism
funding (Weiss). Even though the RICO statute allows for a variety of cases, the lower
courts have continually tried to restrict the “types of enterprises that could qualify for
criminal or civil liability” (Weiss, p. 1134).
One specific terrorism group is al Qaeda. Al Qaeda raises money from many
different sources including legitimate business practices like investments and donations
but also from various criminal schemes (Weiss, 2010). According to many scholars, the
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most important source of funding for al Qaeda comes from charities (Weiss). Some of
these charities are simply fronts for terrorism financing while others are authentic
charities that have been infiltrated by terrorist operatives who steal and redirect funds to
terrorists (Weiss).
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that the “only way to imperil the flow of
money and discourage the financing of terrorist acts is to impose liability on those who
knowingly and intentionally supply the funds to the persons who commit the violent acts”
(Boim v. Quaranic, 2002, p. 1021). Following the terrorist act on September 11, 2001,
Congress passed the Patriot Act of 2001, which amended RICO to include a larger list of
predicate acts (Weiss, 2010). The additional predicate acts included those from the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which includes the
criminalization of providing material support to terrorist organizations (Weiss, 2010).
While addressing the breadth and variability of RICO, the Supreme Court has
stated that it does not have any intention to confine it because Congress was well aware
of the weapon that it created for curbing criminal enterprises; due to this interpretation,
any attempt to limit the reach of RICO should remain with the creators of RICO (Sedima
v. Imrex, 1985; Weiss, 2010). The Supreme Court has no intention to eliminate the
private action available under RICO because Congress has expressly provided it (Weiss).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the fact that RICO has been applied in
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It
demonstrates breadth” (Sedima v. Imrex, p. 499).
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According to Weiss, the war on terror should not solely take place in the sphere of
national security, criminal prosecution, and counterintelligence but also in the realm of
public opinion and public consciousness (Weiss, 2010). This author also suggests that
Congress should consider amending the statute to extend RICO liability specifically to
financial supporters of terrorism (Weiss). Congress is justified to improve this statute
because it will enable victims of terrorism to join the battle against funding terrorist
organizations while also achieving the restitution and retribution that they deserve
(Weiss). Criminal enterprise does more than simply break a law; it is an organization that
propitiates and creates profit from crime, so this conduct deserves greater punishment and
deterrence (Weiss). Weiss suggests that Congress should expand the already broad
statute to be even broader to include the financing of terrorism.
RICO is intentionally broad. The drafters of RICO did recognize that this
statute is a “wide net” that would most likely trap those who are specifically members of
organized crime syndicates (Headley, 1985, p. 419). Courts must recognize that
“organized criminality takes many forms, and that Congress is fully empowered to
provide generous relief for victims even of ‘respected’ enterprises’ egregious conduct”
(Headley, p. 448). The intentionally broad statute should not have a gap like it does now
especially with reference to the issue of securities fraud (Gerardi, 2014).
Securities Fraud Gap
In March of 1995, Representative Christopher Cox proposed an amendment to the
Private Securities Litigations Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) with the goal to limit the use
of RICO in conjunction with securities fraud suits (Blakey & Gerardi, 2014). The
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purpose for amending the statute was to eliminate any possible duplication of suits under
both RICO and the PSLRA (Blakey & Gerardi). Despite the intention of Congress to
remove overlap, a gap now exists between the two statutes that leaves certain victims of
securities fraud unable to seek recourse for the damages from the fault of infringing
parties (Blakey & Gerardi). The gap exists due to “a series of unfortunate rulings from
the federal courts” (Blakey & Gerardi, p. 441). With the current political climate, Blakey
and Gerardi do not expect congress to solve this problem, but they insist that the federal
appeals courts or ultimately the Supreme Court needs to eliminate and corral this gap
(Blakey & Gerardi). This gap needs to be closed so that victims of securities fraud can
have the opportunity to plead their case in the federal courts (Blakey & Gerardi).
Due to the language in the two statutes, the courts should not have found any
incompatibility between RICO and the securities laws (Blakey & Gerardi, 2014). The
PSLRA has provisions that preserve other remedies in other suits, and RICO has a
provision that prevents encroachment on other statutes (Blakey & Gerardi). The resulting
litigation from the creation of PSLRA is not in line with the intention of Congress’s
intent when it created the statute was to reduce unnecessary RICO suits when an
opportunity for recovery exists under other securities laws like the PSLRA is available
(Blakey & Gerardi). The outcome was not only the elimination of overlap between the
two sets of laws but the creation of a gap where both the RICO and the securities laws
cannot be applied (Blakey & Gerardi). Courts are “improperly denying victims of
crimes” access to federal courts which is the opposite of what Congress intended in the
passing of the PSLRA (Blakey & Gerardi, p. 472). The economic downturn of 2007 and
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2008 indicate that the nation needs more deterrence for fraud as well as opportunities for
fraud victims to receive justice (Blakey & Gerardi). RICO needs to be revitalized in the
realm of securities fraud; this needs to be done by the federal courts of appeal to realign
RICO with its mission or else the Supreme Court needs to intervene on this issue (Blakey
& Gerardi).
MLSMK Investment Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co, 2011. A case that took
place in the Second Circuit Court in 2008 demonstrates another issue with the Civil
Section of RICO and the PSLRA amendment. MLSMK Investment Company invested
$12.8 million with Bernard Madoff Investment Securities (Madoff), which was owned
and managed by Bernard Madoff who manipulated the funds as a part of his famous
Ponzi scheme (MLSMK v. Chase, 2011). Madoff made legitimate trades with JP Morgan
Chase (Chase) and Chase Bank, and Chase made money from fees paid by Madoff for
legitimate banking activities. MLSMK filed suit with Chase seeking damages by
claiming that Chase conspired with Madoff in violation of RICO. MLSMK claimed that
Chase had knowledge of the illegitimate activities of Madoff because Chase at one point
was invested in Madoff, but later removed all of its investments. Even though Chase
removed all of its investments in Madoff, it continued to do business with Madoff by
managing his accounts and making legitimate trades. MLSMK claims that Chase knew
of Madoff’s illegal dealings and did nothing to protect the victims of Madoff’s scheme,
but instead chose to protect Madoff and profit from the fees associated with serving him
in legitimate business services.
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The Second Circuit entirely dismissed the plaintiff’s claim based on Rule 12 (b)
(6); the appeals court in the Second District affirmed the ruling because the section of the
PSLRA bars racketeering claims based on securities fraud (MLSMK v. Chase, 2011).
The Court applied other district court opinions to conclude that the language in PSLRA
“unambiguously” bars all claims based on securities fraud conduct (Buscher, 2012, p.
207). Buscher believes that the court incorrectly assessed the goal behind the legislation
and that the case should not have been dismissed. Based on the commentary in the
Committee Report on PRSLA, it appears that some of the authors of the law did not
intend to bar meritorious claims such as the one by MLSMK (Buscher).
Federal case law also barred the plaintiff MLSMK from bringing a claim under
the Securities Exchange Act associated with aiding and abetting, so the only other option
for recovering damages in civil court against Chase was via RICO (Buscher, 2012). With
PSLRA excluding any civil RICO cases associated with securities fraud, many victims
are left with no private cause of action (Buscher).
According to a senate report, the PSLRA was intended to curb frivolous claims
and encourage lawyers to pursue valid claims for some Senators, but others claim that
goal of the legislation was to protect investors in the capital markets (S. Rep. No. 104-98,
1995; Buscher, 2012). However, Buscher claims that these intentions are isolated and
that the overall theme of the legislation is to promote meritorious claims. And no doubt
remains that the claims of MLSMK against Chase are meritorious (Buscher). Dissenting
Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer believed that in order to balance the barring of
frivolous claims with meritorious claims, a provision in the law is needed that restores
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liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud (Buscher). Concerning the PSLRA and
the case of MLSMK, the court missed the overall goal behind the amendment, which was
to simply deter meritless claims, not to throw out worthy cases (Buscher). According to
Senator Dodd and other dissenting Senators, securities fraud victims should not be left
without private action as a repercussion of this act, and while deterring meritless claims,
laws are needed to ensure that “legitimate victims can continue to sue and can recover
damages quickly” (S. Rep. No. 104-98; Buscher, p. 211). The case of MLSMK v. Chase
demonstrates a problem with RICO and securities fraud, but the case of Sedima v. Imrex
is valuable for comprehending the Supreme Court’s understanding and application of the
law.
Sedima S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 1985
The case of Sedima v. Imrex is a very important case for considering the
implications of the civil RICO statute. This court case involved two parties that were
partners in a business venture. The plaintiff, Sedima alleges that the defendant, Imrex,
was inflating bills and expenses to cheat Sedima out of proceeds by collecting on
expenses that did not exist (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985). This Supreme Court case decided
whether the civil RICO statute permits suits against defendants who have not been
convicted of criminal RICO charges and whether damages other than racketeering
injuries can be recovered (Sedima v. Imrex). Considering that the civil court has a lower
burden of proof, it does not make sense to require a criminal prosecution, so the Court
decided that a criminal prosecution is not necessary in order for a civil RICO suit to take
place (Sedima v. Imrex). The Court also decided that because the language in RICO is
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very broad, injuries need not to have resulted from a criminal enterprise, but suits may be
brought against legitimate businesses when they can be found at fault for breaching any
of the predicate acts (Sedima v. Imrex).
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Sedima v. Imrex (1985), the
court noted that private action under RICO was beginning to evolve into
something quite different from the original conception of its enactors:
Originally designed to decrease the activity of mobsters and organized
criminals, RICO was beginning to become a common tool for everyday fraud
cases brought against 'respected and legitimate' enterprises. (Buscher, 2012, p.
208)
Civil RICO prior to Sedima v. Imrex. Prior to the case of Sedima v. Imrex,
RICO was limited by the courts, which had decided to restrict which plaintiffs could
bring claims under the statute, and four limitations were consistently used (Brady, 1986).
The first was that the defendant must have had some sort of connection to organized
crime (Brady). The second was that “the plaintiff must allege a unique inquiry in
addition to the injury flowing from the predicate acts” (Brady, p. 1121). Third, the
enterprise had to be separate from the defendant or from the pattern of racketeering
(Brady). Fourth, the defendant had to have already been criminally convicted of a
predicate act (Brady). The district and circuit courts have placed these restrictions
assuming that Congress did not intend to create such a far-reaching law (Brady).
Different courts have chosen to enforce the law by recognizing that the language of the
statute is intentionally broad (Brady). In truth, Congress chose to enact RICO with non-
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specific language, so the restrictions that have been employed by the courts are not in
alignment with Congress’s intentions (Brady).
Civil RICO after Sedima v. Imrex. The case of Sedima v. Imrex gave the
Supreme Court the chance to eliminate some of the inconsistencies among courts as well
as remove the major restrictions on RICO (Brady, 1986). Due to the decision, plaintiffs
are no longer required to “allege a prior conviction and a separate racketeering injury”
(Brady, p. 1153).
Ultimately, concerning the RICO statute, Congress has not communicated its
intentions as well as most parties interpreting it would like (Brady, 1986). However,
Congress has not made any major changes to the statute other than adding and removing
predicate acts. Congress has the power to change how the statute is interpreted by
introducing new legislation or amending prior legislation, so if Congress is not pleased
with how RICO is being interpreted, then Congress alone must take action to correct the
misapplication (Brady).
Solutions for the Ambiguity and Limitations of RICO
Three main remedies that have been utilized to curb the misuse of the civil section
of RICO include self-policing, narrow statutory construction, and simply repealing the
civil section of RICO (Nybo, 2013). Some other solutions include, allowing the districts
to have their separate interpretations narrowly construing the statute, a Supreme Court
Ruling, and having Congress amend the law.
Self-Policing

REDEFINING THE RICO STATUTE

31

Self-Policing would be the simplest remedy to reduce the amount of frivolous
RICO cases filed. Currently, the United States Attorney’s Office is successfully
regulating itself regarding criminal RICO claims because federal prosecutors are required
to get formal approval from the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (Dept. of
Justice, 1997). However, this solution does not guarantee results because for civil suits,
self-policing has been regarded as a conflict of interest (Nybo, 2013). The legal
profession has come under heavy criticism for self-regulation because lawyers cannot be
expected to regulate their members effectively (Nybo). This solution does not address
the need to broaden the statute to address the issues with terrorism financing and
securities fraud. Similar to the solution to encourage courts to self-regulate is the idea to
let District Courts continue to rule differently.
Allow Circuit Courts the Freedom to Define the Statute
The decisions made by the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts each set
precedent for the inferior courts in each of their circuits. Application of the civil RICO
standing statute could continue to be determined by the circuit courts. This option would
be simple to institute and would not require any significant changes. The circuit courts
can continue to make rulings consistent with their prior opinions even though they
disagree with other circuits. The substantial problem with this solution is that
inconsistencies remain between circuits in interpretation of the standing statute for RICO
(Lloyd, 2005). This solution also does not address the changes that are needed in the
language of the statute. Another option would be to give the courts a general instruction
to narrowly construe the civil RICO statute.
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Narrow Construction
Another possible remedy would be for the courts to narrowly construe the RICO
provisions to actual criminal organizations (Nybo, 2013). One example of when a district
court attempted to narrowly construe the injury element of RICO was in the case of
Sedima v. Imrex (Nybo). The Second Circuit Court decided in this case that any injury in
a civil RICO claim should be specifically related to an activity that RICO was designed
to deter not just injuries related to the predicate acts (Sedima v. Imrex, 1984). The
Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation of the injury clause because it
determined that the goal of RICO was not just to deter criminal enterprises but also the
predicate acts (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985). Though a narrow construction applied by all the
courts would be a simple remedy, it would require congressional approval because the
Supreme Court clearly endorsed the liberal interpretation of RICO in civil suits (Sedima
v. Imrex, 1985; Nybo). Ultimately, this solution addresses only the need to narrow the
statute in certain instances while it entirely neglects the need to extend the statute; it also
goes against the directive of the Supreme Court.
Repeal
A simple solution would be to repeal the civil RICO statute or at least remove the
treble damages provision. However, the statute has demonstrated some success in the
prosecutions and deterrence of criminal enterprise, so the simplest option would not be
the most beneficial. With the continual threat of organized crime, repeal is not the
correct remedy, but enforcing a specific rule of court procedure may help reduce
frivolous claims (Nybo, 2013).
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Strict Enforcement of Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the option to impose
sanctions on attorneys who file papers with the court that are not supported by reasonable
inquiry or otherwise lack merit (Nybo, 2013). Rule 11(b) specifies that when an attorney
submits a signed document to the court, he or she certifies that the document
(1) is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or
for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the
denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. (Fed. R.
Civ. P., 2007, 11(b) (1)-(4))
According to the Supreme Court, the goal of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in
District Court (Cooter v. Hartmarx, 1990). Nybo believes that Rule 11 is the best
solution to reduce manipulation of civil RICO, and some circuit courts have already
utilized Rule 11 to punish litigants whose pleadings misused the rule’s standards (Nybo,
2013). Even though Rule 11 is a good option as a remedy, due to its peculiar language,
multiple issues persist with the application of Rule 11 (Nybo, p. 37-43). Nybo concludes
that Rule 11 will not successfully remove all malfeasance of RICO, but district courts
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need to “utilize its expansive discretion in punishing the parties (attorneys and clients
alike) who are responsible” for the unashamed exploitation of RICO (p. 49). Courts need
to utilize Rule 11 to protect their dockets and the legitimacy of the RICO statute (Nybo).
In order to properly deter misuse while maintaining the functionality of RICO, Rule 11 is
a good place to punish fraudulent RICO claimants (Nybo). The enforcing of Rule 11 is
practical and necessary, but it does not address the reasonable and appropriate use of
RICO and the expansion for improvement.
Supreme Court Ruling
The Supreme Court has the power to set precedent for all of the inferior courts
including the circuit courts. The benefit of the Supreme Court making a decision on the
definition of standing for civil RICO is that its implementation will be uniform after its
ruling. However, the judicial branch cannot correct the inherent imperfections of RICO
and rewrite the law (Lloyd, 2007). Ultimately, the best solution to succinctly enhance the
civil RICO statute would be to amend the law.
Legislative Action
Congress has the authority and ability to clarify the terms of RICO swiftly and
definitely. From his concurring opinion in Diaz v. Gates (2005) Judge Reinhardt
suggested that Congress “take another look at RICO and consider amending the statute so
as to limit it to its original purpose" (Lloyd, 2007, p. 140). If nothing is done, the
inconsistencies will continue, and courts will continue to disagree on the rendition of the
civil RICO statute (Lloyd). The only downside with the legislature redefining the law is
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the political process of drafting and passing the law and the challenges that it involves,
but the benefit of this application will solve the current problem with RICO.
Congress can solve the problem by better defining the standing requirements for
civil RICO and using more specific and detailed language that will better explain the
purpose of the law for proper execution by the courts. By adding specific definitions for
the standing, pattern, proximate causation, and enterprise elements, the statute will not be
misinterpreted and inconsistently construed. If Congress were to amend the statute, it
would have the opportunity to remove copyright infringement liability for small scale
offenders as well as make a decision on the culpability of foreign sovereigns in the
context of civil RICO. Congress would have the unquestionable authority to ensure that
indirect victims have the ability to sue under RICO. Weiss (2010) suggests that Congress
extend the RICO statute so that financial supporters of terrorism can be liable under civil
RICO. With litigation, the securities fraud gap could be closed to ensure right of action
for securities fraud victims (Blakey & Gerardi, 2014). Unlike all the other solutions,
legislative action by Congress would be capable of addressing every issue with the
statute. Congress has the authority to change the statute as well as the power to influence
how the statute is interpreted by the courts.
Conclusion
Pierson’s study on the civil RICO statute demonstrated that it has been employed
relatively little yet maligned much (2013). Civil RICO is not yet fully developed, which
is why it has not been fully utilized, but as it matures, it will grow into its usefulness
(Pierson). The broad language of the RICO statute has led to problems with its
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interpretation and application (Pierson). However, the powerful statute can be expanded
to include terrorism financing, securities fraud, and indirect victims. The District and
Circuit courts have continually applied a narrow interpretation of the statute, which goes
against the will of the Supreme Court and Congress (Pierson). Legislative action would
correct this problem and the others associated with the statute. According to the Supreme
Court, Congress was aware of the weapon that it created for curbing criminal enterprises,
and any attempt to change the language or interpretation of RICO should remain in the
hands of its creators (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985; Weiss, 2010). Solving the problems related
to civil RICO would open the door for those who have been cut off from justice and help
serve the original purpose of the law as created by Congress, which is to punish and deter
organizations that commit crime.
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